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THE SEARCH FOR A SENSIBLE SEXTING SOLUTION:
A CALL FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION
Eric S. Latzer

I.

∗

INTRODUCTION

In March 2009, a federal district judge sitting in Pennsylvania effectively quashed a local prosecutor’s efforts to punish teens for an
1
increasingly widespread phenomenon called sexting. The case, Mil2
ler v. Skumanick, garnered nationwide attention and sparked a flurry
3
of sexting media coverage. Sexting occurs when someone sends via
text message or posts on the internet sexually charged messages or
4
images, including nude or semi-nude pictures. Although not limited
to younger people, a growing number of teenagers continue to en5
gage in sexting and consequently, the issue has become a source of
widespread discussion among parents, lawmakers, and society generally. Fundamentally, teenage sexting is a product of sexual curiosity,
poor judgment, and a modern trend in which teenagers utilize elec6
tronic file sharing as their primary method of communication.
∗
J.D. Candidate, 2011, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., cum laude,
2008, The College of New Jersey. I would like to thank my mom, dad, and brother
for their invaluable love, support, and assistance. I would also like to thank Professor
Kip Cornwell and Andrew Darcy for all of their input.
1
See Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 637 (M.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d sub
nom. Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010).
2
Id.
3
See, e.g., Editorial, Protect Kids from Dangers of Sexting, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Jan. 3,
2010, at D5, available at 2010 WLNR 134747.
4
Miller, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 637.
Typically, the subject takes a picture of him- or herself with a digital
camera or cell phone camera, or asks someone else to take that picture. That picture is stored as a digitized image and then sent via textmessage or the photo-send function on a cell phone, transmitted by
computer through electronic mail, or posted to an internet website like
Facebook or Myspace.
Id.
5
See infra Part II.A.
6
See Riva Richmond, Sexting May Place Teens at Legal Risk, GADGETWISE, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 26, 2009, 12:00 PM), http://gadgetwise.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/26/
sexting-may-place-teens-at-legal-risk/.
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Perhaps most importantly in the context of sexting,
“[t]echnology and mores are changing so rapidly that they have outstripped the ability of . . . the law, parents, and prosecutors to keep
7
up.” And in what has become a disturbing trend, prosecutors
around the country have chosen to criminalize these teenage indiscretions by employing harsh child pornography laws, including some
that require teenage offenders to register as sex offenders under Me8
gan’s Law. When lawmakers adopted child pornography laws, they
were designed to prevent adult abuses of minors; in sexting prosecutions, though, prosecutors often attempt to punish “the very victims
9
these laws were designed to protect.” In fact, prosecutors routinely
target minors who create or distribute sexually explicit photographs,
10
including pictures that depict the offenders themselves.
Often,
these prosecutors are concerned that the explicit photographs will
circulate beyond the intended recipients and that a child porno11
grapher will ultimately come into their possession.
In the wake of Miller and several other well-publicized prosecu12
tions, a debate has occurred regarding the appropriate societal and
legal response to teenage sexting. Presently, potential criminal penalties for sexting vary widely, both in terms of their severity and the
circumstances to which they are or are not applicable. In a most extreme scenario, under current federal sentencing guidelines, a sixteen-year-old girl could receive life in prison as punishment for elec13
tronically sending sexually explicit pictures to a boy her age. Non14
criminal ramifications for sexting may also occur, including instances of in-school bullying, which often necessitate a societal response that is beyond the purview of criminal laws.

7

Editorial, Sexting and the Single Girl, 195 N.J.L.J. 934, 950 (2009).
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
See, e.g., A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
12
See infra Part II.B.1.
13
Richmond, supra note 6. According to Mark Rasch, a former cybercrime prosecutor, if the girl was eventually released, she might have to register as a sex offender. Id. Rasch said, “The combination of poorly drafted laws, new technologies, draconian and inflexible punishments, and teenage hormones make for potentially
disastrous results.” Id.
14
See, e.g., Dick Russ, Ohio to Address ‘Sexting’ Laws, WKYC (Apr. 14, 2009, 7:22
AM), http://www.wkyc.com/print.aspx?storyid=111478 (detailing an Ohio story, in
which an eighteen-year-old from Cincinnati committed suicide after she sexted a
naked picture of herself which was subsequently forwarded to nearly every one of her
high school classmates).
8
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This Comment will explore the numerous manifestations of
16
teenage sexting with a broad focus on consensual and nonconsensual sexting. Consensual sexting includes situations in which two or
more juveniles transmit photos of one or both people to each other,
17
and each juvenile participates knowingly and willfully. Alternatively,
nonconsensual sexting essentially entails situations in which the pictures or messages are sent or displayed without the consent of the
18
subject. The Comment will ultimately urge lawmakers to pass anticipatory laws that directly address both consensual and nonconsensual
sexting. Such legislative action will curtail current prosecutorial application of child pornography statutes to sexting.
Part II will broadly detail sexting with a focus on statistics and
notable judicial responses to sexting in which courts have assessed
novel prosecutorial applications of mostly antiquated child pornography laws. Part II will also include perspectives on the proper societal response to sexting, including two competing—albeit broad—
scholarly approaches. Part III will detail recent state responses to
sexting, including proposed and passed legislation. The author will
highlight the potential effects of such laws, while additionally noting
that most state legislatures have thus far remained silent about sexting. Even among states that have addressed sexting, responses have
typically ignored the controversial realm of nonconsensual sexting.
Finally, Part IV proposes a legislative response. Specifically, it
will argue that, once equipped with a proper understanding of the
many manifestations of sexting, lawmakers should decriminalize certain types and provide for a more sensible response to others. More
generally, this Comment’s proposed solutions will allow legislatures
to pass laws that are consistent with the legislative purpose behind
child pornography laws and in accord with public policy goals. The
proposed laws will further seek to limit prosecutorial discretion and

15

The author recognizes that it is nearly impossible to anticipate all of the circumstances in which sexting may evolve. With this in mind, this Comment will
strongly emphasize two overarching manifestations of sexting: consensual and nonconsensual.
16
Unless otherwise noted, this Comment will focus on sexting that involves teens,
including eighteen and nineteen- year-olds, who are legally considered adults, but
nonetheless relevant in analyzing teenage sexting.
17
The concept extends to when a teen knowingly posts photos of himself or herself on the internet.
18
Nonconsensual sexting has also been referred to as “malicious” sexting. See
Peggy O’Crowley, The Sexting Generation, INSIDE JERSEY (Sept. 21, 2009, 3:34 PM),
http://www.nj.com/insidejersey/index.ssf/2009/08/the_sexting_generation.html.
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eliminate disproportional penalties, including sex-offender registration, for teenage sexting offenders.
II. SCRUTINIZING SEXTING: FROM STATISTICS TO JUDICIAL AND
SCHOLARLY RESPONSES
A. The Statistics Behind Sexting
Although fairly limited, research indicates that a substantial
19
number of teenagers engage in sexting. The primary source for statistics on sexting is a 2008 survey conducted by the National Campaign to Prevent Teen and Unplanned Pregnancy and Cosmo20
girl.com (“the survey”). Between September 25, 2008, and October
3, 2008, the survey makers polled approximately 1,280 teens and
21
young adults. For purposes of this Comment, the pertinent statistics
focus on 653 of these participants who were teenagers between the
22
ages of thirteen and nineteen. Among the 653 teens, 75% said they
knew that sending sexually suggestive content, whether messages or
23
images, would have “serious negative consequences.” Still, despite
their awareness of these potential ramifications, 20% of the teens said
that they had electronically sent or posted on the internet nude or

19
See THE NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN AND UNPLANNED PREGNANCY &
COSMOGIRL.COM, SEX AND TECH: RESULTS FROM A SURVEY OF TEENS AND YOUNG ADULTS
1 (2008), available at http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/sextech/PDF/SexTech
_Summary.pdf [hereinafter CAMPAIGN]. According to its creators, the survey was the
first public one of its kind to assess the number of teens who engage in sexting. Id. at
5.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 5.
22
Under applicable statutes, pictures of teens ages eighteen and nineteen do not
amount to child pornography. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6312(d)(1) (2010)
(“Any person who intentionally views or knowingly possesses or controls any book,
magazine, pamphlet, slide, photograph, film, videotape, computer depiction or other material depicting a child under the age of 18 years engaging in a prohibited sexual
act or in the stimulation of such commits an offense.” (emphasis added)). But if an
eighteen or nineteen-year-old forwards such pictures to a minor, the eighteen or nineteen-year-old may be prosecuted for disseminating such material to a minor. See,
e.g., State v. Canal, 773 N.W.2d 528, 529 (Iowa 2009) (upholding the conviction of
defendant for knowingly disseminating obscene material to a minor under Iowa
Code § 728.2 (2005)). With this in mind, an important statistic from the National
Campaign to Prevent Teen and Unplanned Pregnancy and Cosmogirl.com research
is that among the 653 teens, eleven percent were young teen girls, between thirteen
and sixteen, who said they had engaged in sexting. CAMPAIGN, supra note 19, at 1
(emphasis added).
23
CAMPAIGN, supra note 19, at 3. The survey-makers do not define “serious negative consequences.” Id.
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semi-nude pictures or videos of themselves. This nonchalance is al25
so evidenced in mainstream media explorations of sexting.
The statistics garnered from the survey are widely cited by main26
stream media sources. Although one researcher has questioned the
27
survey’s veracity, other polls also indicate that sexting is pervading
teenage culture. As an example, the Hearst Corporation has conducted a poll in which 20% of teens admitted that they have sent sex28
ually explicit photos of themselves through text messages. In addition, wiredsafety.org, a non-profit organization dedicated to internet
safety, conducted research that indicates that 44% of teen boys said
29
they have seen at least one naked picture of a female classmate. Not
surprisingly, statistics also indicate that sexting is not limited to tee30
nagers in this country. As the foregoing research indicates, sexting
appears to be a pervasive phenomenon in teen culture.
24

Id. at 1.
See O’Crowley, supra note 18. O’Crowley describes an otherwise typical North
Jersey teen who posts nude pictures of herself on Facebook despite knowing that it is
“inappropriate” and that she “can get into deep trouble and cause embarrassment
for herself and her family.” Id. The author additionally cites a survey conducted by
Susan Lipkins, a New York psychologist who works with children and adolescents. Id.
Lipkins said that about half of her survey recipients “posted suggestive or erotic images even though they already realized the material could get them in trouble at
school or work. Most also [said] they were aware it could cause them potential personal and family embarrassment.” Id.
26
See, e.g., Donna Leinwand, Survey: 1 in 5 Teens Sext Despite Risks, U.S.A. TODAY,
June 25, 2009, at A3; Rachel Simmons, The Sext Generation, HUFFINGTON POST (June
18, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rachel-simmons/the-sext-generation_
b_217715.html.
27
See PETER E. CUMMING, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, VOICES, TECHNOLOGY, SEXUALITY 1, 6
(May 26, 2009), available at http://www.arts.yorku.ca/huma/cummingp/documents
/TeenSextingbyPeterCummingMay262009.pdf. Cumming, criticizing the survey, has
said that it was conducted exclusively online, the survey makers “no doubt have
vested interests in the results,” and that “the very broad category of ‘nude or seminude’ photos used in the survey questions recognizes no distinctions between nudity,
sexuality, and pornography.” Id. at 6.
28
Parental Controls Help Guard Against Sexting, WISN.COM (July 28, 2009),
http://www.wisn.com/news/20207767/detail.html.
29
Alexandra Marks, Charges Against ‘Sexting’ Teens Highlight Legal Gaps, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 31, 2009, at 25.
30
In the UK, for example, Beatbullying, a British charity devoted to preventing
bullying in school settings, conducted its own sexting research. See generally
BEATBULLYING, http://www.beatbullying.org/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2011). Survey recipients included 2,000 teenagers, ages eleven to eighteen-years old. Truth of Sexting
Amongst UK Teens, BEATBULLYING (Aug. 4, 2009), http://www.beatbullying.org/dox/
media-centre/news-archive/August%2009/truth_of_sexting.html. Of the teens surveyed, 38% stated they had received a sexually explicit or distressing text or email.
Id. Out of the 38% that received messages, 70% of the teens said they knew the
sender of the message, 45% of the sexually explicit messages were from a peer, and
25
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B. Beyond Statistics: How to Combat Sexting
Against this statistical backdrop, it is important to realize that
sexting manifests itself in a variety of circumstances. To fully understand the debate surrounding both the appropriate societal response
to sexting and the impact of several judicial rulings, one must be
cognizant of two overarching sexting manifestations: consensual sext31
ing and nonconsensual sexting. As this Comment will illustrate,
32
most societal discussion and legislative responses focus on consensual sexting.
1.

Prosecutorial and Judicial Responses to Sexting

Many prosecutors nationwide have attempted to curb teenage
33
sexting. In doing so, the prosecutors have utilized antiquated child
pornography statutes by charging children under the same statutes
34
originally designed to protect them. In Miller—which has become
one of the most recognized sexting cases—a local prosecutor in
Pennsylvania sought to compel several teenagers involved in a sexting
incident at a local school to complete a program focused on educa35
tion and counseling. The district attorney, George Skumanick, told
the parents of the sexting teens that any teen who refused to complete the program would be charged under the state’s child porno36
graphy laws and forced to register as a sex offender. Skumanick’s
primary targets were the girls who had taken and were depicted in
37
the pictures. The pictures in question included one in which two
girls were shown in suggestive poses and another that showed one of
23% were from a current boyfriend or girlfriend. Id. One should note that this survey broadly states that the content distributed between and among teens was “sexually explicit or distressing.” Id. Unlike the previous survey conducted by the National
Campaign to Prevent Teen and Unplanned Pregnancy and Cosmogirl.com, which
differentiated between sexually suggestive messages and messages containing nude
or semi-nude photos, this survey does not undertake such a specific inquiry. Accordingly, for purposes of analyzing the potential criminality of sexting participants, this
survey is not as instructive.
31
See supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text.
32
See infra Part III.
33
See, e.g., Richmond, supra note 6 (highlighting sexting prosecutions in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Wisconsin).
34
Id.
35
See Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 638 (M.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d sub
nom. Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010). The program was created to
teach the girls to “gain an understanding of how their actions were wrong[,] . . . gain
an understanding of what it means to be a girl in today’s society, both advantages and
disadvantages, and . . . identify nontraditional societal and job roles.” Id.
36
Id. at 639.
37
Id.
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the girls with a towel wrapped around her body just below her
38
breasts. The children’s parents ultimately brought suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and alleged that Skumanick’s take-it-or-leave-it counseling offer constituted a violation of the children’s rights under the
39
First and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs filed a motion for
a temporary restraining order against Skumanick to preclude him
40
from filing criminal charges against the girls.
In ruling for the
plaintiffs, the court took the “extraordinary” step of granting the
41
temporary restraining order against Skumanick.
Following the court’s issuance of a temporary restraining order,
Skumanick said that he would appeal the order but only pursue
42
charges against Nancy Doe, the girl pictured with a towel below her
43
breasts. On appeal, despite Skumanick’s concession, the Third Circuit affirmed the issuance of the temporary restraining order as ap44
plied to Nancy Doe. It noted that although prosecutors routinely
and permissibly present defendants with pre-indictment offers of leniency, Skumanick’s take-it-or-leave-it counseling offer was “likely retaliatory, rather than a good faith effort to enforce the law, [as
shown] by the lack of evidence of probable cause” against Nancy
45
Doe. Specifically, the court noted that even assuming the state’s
child pornography laws applied to the photo in question—an issue
upon which the court expressly did not rule—Skumanick failed to
present any evidence that Doe ever possessed or distributed the pho46
to, two alternative requirements under the statute. In fact, at oral
argument, the district attorney’s office only pointed to evidence of
the existence of the photograph itself and the fact that it had ap47
peared on classmates’ cell phones.
As the court noted,
“[A]ppearing in a photograph provides no evidence as to whether
38

Id. The suggestive picture showed two girls “from the waist up, each wearing a
white opaque towel.” Id.
39
Id. at 640.
40
Id.
41
Miller, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 641 (citing Winter v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 375 (2008) (calling an injunction an “‘extraordinary remedy’
that is never awarded as of right”)).
42
The district court in Miller allowed the girl, Nancy, and her mother, Jane, to
proceed under pseudonyms. Id. at 639 n.2.
43
Dionne Searcey, A Lawyer, Some Teens and a Fight Over ‘Sexting,’ WALL ST. J., Apr.
21, 2009, at A17.
44
Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 2010).
45
Id. at 153.
46
Id. at 153–54.
47
Id. at 154.
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48

that person possessed or transmitted the photo.” Accordingly, the
court affirmed the lower’s court’s issuance of a temporary restraining
49
order. It noted, however, that the district attorney could later move
50
to vacate the injunction upon a showing of probable cause.
Given this option, should the current district attorney, Jeff Mit51
chell, decide to bring charges against Nancy Doe, he will likely utilize Pennsylvania’s child pornography statue and its severe attendant
52
punishments. If the statute is applied literally, and the State can
prove that Doe either possessed or distributed the photo, Mitchell’s
prosecution may prove successful. The State would have to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the girl’s nudity was “depicted for the
purpose of sexual stimulation or gratification of any person who
53
might view [the] depiction” of a child under age eighteen. Ultimately, without any legislative guidance and despite the ruling in Miller, the prosecutor’s discretion could control, no matter how absurd
the result.
The Miller case is also notable for several reasons. Significantly,
the case illustrates the dangers of prosecutorial discretion. In Miller,
54
one of the charged plaintiffs was wrapped in a towel. Despite this
fact, Skumanick reasoned that any girl dressed “provocatively” was
55
subject to harsh criminal sanctions. Convinced that he could employ plainly inapplicable laws, Skumanick abused his prosecutorial
discretion by seeking to make examples of the sexting participants.
Skumanick threatened to charge the children under the state’s child
pornography law, which prohibits one from “knowingly possess[ing]”
a picture “depicting a child under the age of eighteen years engaging
56
in a prohibited sexual act.”
The Act defines a “prohibited sexual
act” to include “lewd exhibition of the genitals or nudity if such nudity is depicted for the purpose of sexual stimulation or gratification of
57
any person who might view such depiction.”

48

Id.
Id. at 155.
50
Miller, 598 F.3d at 154.
51
District Attorney Skumanick lost to Mitchell in a November 2009 election. Id.
at 145.
52
See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6312(d)(1) (2010).
53
§ 6312(a).
54
Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 639 (M.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d sub nom.
Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010).
55
See Searcey, supra note 43.
56
§ 6312(d)(1).
57
§ 6312(g).
49
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As further evidence of such prosecutorial indiscretion, Skumanick created his own rules, and in doing so, he afforded parents a rigid take-it-or-leave-it offer. When questioned about his mandate that
children could only avoid criminal charges if they completed the
counseling and education program, he flatly told the accused children’s parents that “these are the rules [and] [i]f you don’t like them,
58
too bad.” Ultimately, and most importantly, the federal judge in
Miller, in a ruling affirmed by the Third Circuit, did not “like” Sku59
manick’s “rules.” Although the Miller case has garnered significant
60
mainstream media coverage, several other judicial responses to sexting are noteworthy in that the courts have in large part been unsympathetic to the sexting teens and accordingly allow prosecutorial dis61
cretion to control.
In fact, the courts are content to affirm
prosecutorial applications of child pornography statutes to sexting
62
participants. Despite the result in Miller, and as the subsequent cases illustrate, little debate typically surrounds the application of child
63
pornography laws in most sexting cases.
In A.H. v. State, a Florida appeals court upheld the conviction of
two juveniles charged with violating a Florida child pornography
64
law. The prosecutor filed charges after the juveniles, who were boyfriend and girlfriend, took pictures of themselves naked and engaged
65
in sexual behavior. As in a typical consensual sexting situation, the
juveniles emailed the photos to each other, but the photos never cir66
culated to a third party. On appeal, the defendant, A.H., argued

58

Miller, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 638.
Id.
60
See, e.g., Michael Rubinkam, Judge Blocks Charges in Teen ‘Sexting’ Case, MSNBC
(Mar. 30, 2009, 8:20 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29964324/.
61
See, e.g., A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); State v.
Canal, No. 07-1051, 2009 WL 3051556, at *1 (Iowa Sept. 18, 2009); State v. Vezzoni,
No. 22361-2-III, 2005 Wash. App. LEXIS 864, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2005).
62
Notably, the district court in Miller, in issuing the temporary restraining order,
highlighted that the prosecutor sought to pursue charges against two of the girls who
were merely pictured “provocatively.” See Searcey, supra note 41.
63
See Stephen F. Smith, Jail for Juvenile Child Pornographers?: A Reply to Professor
Leary, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 505, 513 (2008). Smith noted that child pornography
laws “clearly do not exempt cases where minors produce or disseminate pornographic images of themselves. They plainly apply to any pornographic depictions of a minor. It makes no difference, from a definitional standpoint, whether or not the child
pornography was produced by the minor featured in the images.” Id.
64
949 So. 2d 234, 235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
65
Id.
66
Id.
59
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67

68

that the Florida statute was unconstitutional as applied to her.
Specifically, A.H.’s primary contention was that the application of the
69
statute violated her state constitutional right to privacy. The court
disagreed and first stated that “[t]he State’s interest in protecting
children from exploitation in this statute is the same regardless of
whether the person inducing the child to appear in a sexual performance and then promoting that performance is an adult or a mi70
nor.” The court added that A.H. had no reasonable expectation of
privacy when she and her boyfriend took the pictures and subse71
quently emailed them to each other. Interestingly, the court—citing
the Florida legislature’s desire to prevent further production of such
images—was concerned that the consensual sexting would evolve into
72
nonconsensual sexting. In fact, the likelihood that the exchanged
photos might become public, ultimately compelled the court to rule
73
in favor of the State.
More recently, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed another consensual sexting prosecution and upheld the conviction of the defen74
dant in State v. Canal. Canal was eighteen when he sent a photo of
75
his erect penis to his friend C.E., who at the time was fourteen.
Canal and C.E. admitted that Canal sent the picture as a joke and on-

67

See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.071(3) (West 2006).
A person is guilty of promoting a sexual performance by a child when,
knowing the character and content thereof, he or she produces, directs, or promotes any performance which includes sexual conduct by
a child less than 18 years of age. Whoever violates this subsection is
guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

68

A.H., 949 So. 2d at 235.
Id.
Id. at 238.
Id. at 237.
Id. at 238.
Appellant asserts that the State only has a compelling interest when the
photograph or video is shown to a third party. The Legislature has,
however, recognized a compelling interest in seeing that the videotape
or picture including “sexual conduct by a child of less than 18 years of
age” is never produced.

Id.
69
70
71
72

Id.
73
Id. (“The fact that these photographs may have or may not have been shown in
no way affects the minor’s reasonable expectation that there was a distinct and real
possibility that the other teenager involved would at some point make these photos
public.”).
74
773 N.W.2d 528, 529 (Iowa 2009).
75
Id.
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76

ly upon C.E.’s request.
Despite this fact, after C.E.’s mother
checked her daughter’s email, found the photograph, and subsequently turned it over to the police, Iowa authorities charged Canal
77
under Iowa Code section 728.2 for knowingly disseminating obscene
78
material to a minor.
Canal urged the court to set aside the conviction and argued
that insufficient evidence supported the jury’s conclusion that the
79
photograph he sent to C.E. was obscene. He contended that the
picture that he sent “only appealed to a natural interest in sex” and
80
was thus not obscene. Notably, Canal, not seeking to challenge the
81
statute as applied to him, made no argument that such application
ran counter to the legislature’s intent when it passed the child pornography law or to the state’s overarching public policy considerations. As such, the court did not address these issues. Ultimately, in
affording considerable deference to the jury’s verdict, the court disa82
greed with Canal and upheld his conviction.
In 2005, state prosecutors in Washington successfully pursued a
nonconsensual sexting conviction, which a state appellate court ultimately upheld. In State v. Vezzoni, the defendant, a sixteen-year-old,
took pictures of his girlfriend, also sixteen, which depicted her un83
clothed breasts and genitals. Without her consent, the defendant
76

Id.
IOWA CODE § 728.2 (2010) (“Any person, other than the parent or guardian of
the minor, who knowingly disseminates or exhibits obscene material to a minor, including the exhibition of obscene material so that it can be observed by a minor on
or off the premises where it is displayed, is guilty of a public offense and shall upon
conviction be guilty of a serious misdemeanor.”).
78
Canal, 773 N.W.2d 528 at 529.
79
Id. at 530. Obscenity is defined as
any material depicting or describing the genitals, sex acts, masturbation, excretory functions or sadomasochistic abuse which the average
person, taking the material as a whole and applying contemporary
community standards with respect to what is suitable material for minors, would find appeals to the prurient interest and is patently offensive; and the material, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, scientific,
political, or artistic value.
Id. at 530–31.
80
Id. at 532.
81
Presumably, this may have been because Canal was eighteen, an adult, at the
time of his conviction. See id. at 529.
82
Canal, 773 N.W.2d 528 at 532 (holding that “the jury could find, by applying its
own contemporary community standards with respect to what is suitable material for
minors, that the material appealed to the prurient interest, was patently offensive,
and lacked serious literary, scientific, political, or artistic value”).
83
No. 22361-2-III, 2005 Wash. App. LEXIS 864, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 28,
2005).
77
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later showed the pictures to his classmates after he and his girlfriend
84
broke up. In appealing his conviction, the defendant argued that
the statute was unconstitutional as applied to a minor in that it in85
fringed on his right to privacy. The court, though, did not find this
argument persuasive. Citing the state’s interest in protecting children from sexual exploitation as well as the legislature’s decision not to
create age-based distinctions for potential offenders under the state’s
child pornography statutes, the court affirmed the defendant’s con86
viction. As these cases illustrate, little judicial sympathy has arisen
for teenage sexting offenders. The courts mechanistically apply child
pornography laws, and in doing so, they destroy child defendants’
lives. The time is ripe for legislatures to act appropriately.
2.

Scholarly Responses

Many question whether any criminal response, let alone the
harsh consequences that stem from criminal liability under child
87
pornography statutes, is appropriate for sexting offenses. Broadly
speaking, a proper societal response to sexting focuses on two competing interests. First, as evidenced by both state and federal legislative responses, society has taken a very forceful approach to combat
88
child pornography. Child pornography offenders—no matter their
89
ages—are punished under very stringent criminal penalties. Working counter to this first interest of eliminating child pornography and
punishing offenders is society’s recognition that minors often engage
in destructive behavior, such as sexting, but they are not mature
enough to appreciate the social harm that is a product of such beha90
vior. Accordingly, these minors should not face criminal law punishment for sexting. The harms that result from sexting include the
possibility that the sexted content can ultimately end up in the pos-

84

Id.
Id. Vezzoni asserted that because case law provides that minors have a constitutional right to engage in private sexual activity, the state was precluded from regulating minors who take and possess pornographic photographs. Id. at *3.
86
Id. at *4–6.
87
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1) (2006) (stating that a first-time offender found
guilty of knowingly disseminating or distributing child pornography “shall be fined
under this title and imprisoned not less than 5 years and not more than 20 years”).
88
Discussion on the Protocols Needed in Online Child Self-Exploitation Cases, VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. (Feb. 5, 2008), mms://wms.edgecastcdn.net/000184/podcast/streaming/
news/0708/child_exploit.wma [hereinafter Child Self-Exploitation Cases Podcast].
89
Id.
90
Id.
85
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91

session of a child pornographer. An additional concern is that material that is initially consensually sexted may later be forwarded with92
out the photo subject’s consent. In a high school setting, for instance, some students have used nonconsensual sexting as a form of
93
revenge, a means to humiliate the photo subject.
To neutralize these competing interests, one researcher has
proposed a relatively comprehensive prosecutorial protocol. Al94
though she has not utilized the “sexting” moniker, Mary Graw Leary,
a former deputy director for the Office of Legal Counsel at the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children and the former director of the National Center for the Protection of Child Abuse, has
95
explored the issue of child “self-exploitation” in great detail. Leary
argues that prosecutors should assess a number of factors to determine whether juvenile prosecution is appropriate in a particular sext96
ing case. She divides the factors into two overarching categories: of97
fender specific and crime specific.
For the offender-specific
considerations, Leary argues that prosecutors should assess why the
juvenile engaged in the activity, the frequency of the juvenile’s activi98
ty, and the juvenile’s age and support network. As for the second
factor, the crime itself, Leary suggests that prosecutors consider “the
circumstances around the exploitation, whether or not other youths
are brought into the production, the role of this particular youth in
the production, whether it was for commercial purposes, or profit
motive, the extent of the distribution, the theme of the images, and
99
the severity of the images.” By assessing these factors, the state can
determine if prosecution is required or another approach is more
100
appropriate.

91
See O’Crowley, supra note 18. The author quotes John Shehan, the director of
Exploited Child Division of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children,
who said, “These [child pornographers] collect these images like your average citizen
collects baseball cards. . . . The content can live out there forever.” Id.
92
Id.
93
Id. (describing the story of an anonymous New Jersey high school teacher who
said a student at her school was suspended for such “revenge” sexting).
94
Leary refers to the sexting content as “self-produced child pornography.” Mary
Graw Leary, Self-Produced Child Pornography: The Appropriate Societal Response to Juvenile
Self-Sexual Exploitation, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1 (2007).
95
Id.
96
See Child Self-Exploitation Cases Podcast, supra note 88.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
See Leary, supra note 95, at 50.
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Leary’s perspective is notable in that she recognizes, albeit fleetingly, that sexting is manifested in many ways. Still, Leary urges a
prosecutorial protocol that would inevitably greatly enhance prosecutorial discretion. Although Leary outlines a comprehensive approach, the ultimate authority in each sexting case would still lie exclusively with the prosecutor, who would be tasked with balancing the
factors and subsequently determining an appropriate course of action. Accordingly, the prosecutor would retain considerable discretion, an approach of which this Comment is skeptical.
In contrast to Leary’s juvenile prosecution option, another researcher has countered that juvenile punishment under the “heavy
101
hand” of the criminal law is not an appropriate response. Stephen
Smith, a professor at the University of Virginia School of Law, equates
102
sexting prosecutions to the prosecution of suicide attempts. He argues that in both instances, the person is calling out for help, and as
such, “[t]he proper response of a compassionate society is to help
people in those situations, not to add legal troubles and incarceration
103
to their list of woes.”
Smith adds that society needs a realistic approach under which prosecutors must recognize a distinction between conventional child pornography and self-produced child por104
105
nography; the harsh punishments were created for the former.
106
As such, Smith argues that in sexting cases, prosecutorial implementation of harsh criminal laws is not wise and accordingly, Leary’s
107
prosecutorial guidelines are unnecessary.
As Leary does, Smith asserts that prosecutorial discretion should
ultimately control; unlike Leary, though, Smith proposes a different
108
end result. Equipped with such discretion, Smith argues that prosecutors should refrain from filing charges and should first utilize
child protective services to rehabilitate children and educate them
109
about the dangers of sexting.
According to Smith, prosecutors
101

See Child Self-Exploitation Cases Podcast, supra note 88; see also Smith, supra
note 63.
102
See Child Self-Exploitation Cases Podcast, supra note 88.
103
Id.
104
See Smith, supra note 63, at 516 (describing conventional child pornography as
that involving the “rape and molestation of children, captured on film or in other
visual formats”).
105
See id.
106
Smith does not use the term sexting and instead utilizes “self-produced child
pornography,” a phrase that Leary employs. Id. at 506; see Leary, supra note 95.
107
See Child Self-Exploitation Cases Podcast, supra note 88.
108
Smith, supra note 63, at 507.
109
Id.
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should only apply criminal laws under very limited circumstances.
For one, he suggests that the criminal law should be used as a means
to entice minors to cooperate with law enforcement officers who seek
111
to eradicate pedophiles and sexual predators.
And he says that
prosecutors should also consider using the criminal law to convince
uncooperative minors “who have made or distributed pornographic
images of themselves in the past to cease and desist and help remedy
112
the situation they created.”
Following a similar approach, other researchers have broadly
113
Several satellite offices of
criticized the criminalization of sexting.
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) have also urged lawmak114
ers to eliminate criminal-law solutions to sexting. Still, while these
researchers, including Smith and the ACLU, are adamant that the
criminal law is not an appropriate remedy to combat sexting, they do
not address instances of nonconsensual sexting.
3.

A Response to Nonconsensual Sexting

With many researchers and lawmakers failing to delineate between consensual and nonconsensual sexting, most states have unsurprisingly neither proposed nor passed laws addressing nonconsen115
sual sexting.
Instead, they are seemingly content to equip
prosecutors with the discretion to apply antiquated child pornography laws. Despite silence from lawmakers, a Florida nonconsensual

110

Id. at 541.
Id.
112
Id. at 541–42.
113
See, e.g., Child Self-Exploitation Cases Podcast, supra note 88. Anne Coughlin,
a professor from the University of Virginia School of Law, questioned whether sexters are “troubled” children. Id. She said,
Nobody fits into school when they’re 15 to 17. Everybody these days
turns to the internet and to Facebook, that’s where they live, that’s
where they talk. . . . The fact that a child is turning to the internet is
not a sign that they’re a troubled child. . . . [Sexting] is a serious social
question.
Id. She added that society cannot trust quick criminal fixes by local prosecutors. Id.;
see also Vivian Berger, Stop Prosecuting Teens for ‘Sexting,’ 197 N.J. L.J. 409, 419 (2009)
(arguing that sexting “is a social, not a criminal problem, to whose solution law enforcement has nothing positive to contribute”).
114
See O’Crowley, supra note 18. “We think this is appropriately addressed within
the family structure.” Id. (quoting Edward Barocas, the legal director of the ACLU of
New Jersey); see also Letter from Jeffrey M. Gamso, Legal Director, American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio, to members of the Ohio General Assembly (Apr. 2, 2009),
available
at
http://www.acluohio.org/issues/JuvenileJustice/LetterToOGA_
Sexting2009_0402.pdf.
115
See infra Part III.
111
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sexting case has garnered considerable mainstream media attention
and evidences why a legislative response to nonconsensual sexting is
116
necessary. At the age of eighteen, Philip Alpert, was convicted of felony child pornography charges and was required to register as a sex
offender after he forwarded pictures of his then sixteen-year-old
117
girlfriend to her friends and family without her consent. Alpert decided to forward the pictures after he and his girlfriend got into a
118
fight.
Alpert’s case illustrates the steep criminal ramifications for nonconsensual sexting when prosecutors utilize child pornography laws.
As a registered sex offender, Alpert is listed “next to people who have
119
raped children” and “molested kids.”
Alpert insists that his situation exemplifies the incompatibility of child pornography laws in the
120
context of sexting.
Despite the consequences that have stemmed from Alpert’s
prosecution, punishment proponents argue that this sort of unforgiving prosecutorial response is appropriate. They cite a recent Ohio
case in which a teen committed suicide after she and her boyfriend
engaged in consensual sexting, and the boyfriend forwarded the
121
girl’s pictures upon their breakup.
Ridiculed by her high school
classmates about the pictures, the girl, Jessica Logan, ultimately
hanged and killed herself in her bedroom, when she was just eigh122
teen-years-old.
As Logan’s situation demonstrates, when teens engage in nonconsensual sexting, the ramifications can be life-changing
123
not just for the offender but for the victim as well.
Thus, punish116

See, e.g., Deborah Feyerick & Sheila Steffen, ‘Sexting’ Lands Teen on Sex Offender
List, CNN (Apr. 7, 2009, 10:50 AM), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-04-07/justice/
sexting.busts_1_phillip-alpert-offender-list-offender-registry?_s=PM:CRIME.
117
See id. (noting that Alpert pleaded no contest to the charges but was later convicted).
118
Id.; Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, When Sex and Cell Phones Collide: Inside
the Prosecution of a Teen Sexting Case, 32 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 16 (2009). The
author quotes Alpert as saying, “I wasn’t thinking at all. Had I thought about it, I
might have realized this is probably illegal, but I certainly wouldn’t have known all
the ramifications of it.” Id.
119
Feyerick & Steffen, supra note 116.
120
See id. The article quotes Alpert as saying, “You think child pornography, you
think six-year-old, three-year-old little kids who can’t think for themselves, who are
taken advantage of. That really wasn’t the case.” Id.
121
Mike Celizic, Her Teen Committed Suicide Over ‘Sexting,’ MSNBC.COM (Mar. 6,
2009, 9:26 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29546030.
122
Id.
123
See Andrea Slane, Sexting, Teens and a Proposed Offence of Invasion of Privacy, IP
OSGOODE (Mar. 16, 2009), http://www.iposgoode.ca/2009/03/sexting-teens-anda-proposed-offence-of-invasion-of-privacy.
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ment proponents can argue that severe criminal ramifications are necessary to combat nonconsensual sexting.
Advocates for harsh penalties can make two additional, related
arguments. For one, legislatures purposefully did not make age dis124
tinctions when they passed child pornography laws.
Accordingly,
because the Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he prevention of
sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a government
125
objective of surpassing importance,” a court or even a prosecutor
refusing to apply a child pornography statute—even one with harsh
attendant consequences—to a minor who engages in nonconsensual
126
sexting would be inappropriate. Related to this assertion is the fact
that, no matter the age of the perpetrator, the existence of child pornography is harmful to the children depicted, to other children ex127
posed to the child pornography, and to society as a whole.
Punishment proponents can therefore argue that prosecutors should
utilize child pornography statutes, even those with harsh attendant
punishments, in an effort to deter any circulation of child pornography. Although this Comment recognizes the potential life-changing
circumstances that can result from nonconsensual sexting, it nonetheless urges legislators to update or adopt laws to more sensibly ad128
dress and deter such sexting.
III. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO SEXTING
In the midst of very well-publicized sexting prosecutions
throughout the country, a number of state legislatures have ad-

124

Id.
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982).
126
As the court stated:
[T]he legislature is well aware of how to create different degrees of
criminal liability on the basis of a specific age disparity between the offender and the victim.” When the legislature declines to make the distinctions based on age in the statute, “[t]here is no room for judicial
interpretation . . . beyond the plain language of the statute.” The legislature did not intend to exclude juvenile offenders from the child pornography statutes.
Vezzoni, No. 22361-2-III, 2005 Wash. App. LEXIS 864, at *6 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 28,
2005) (quoting State v. D.H., 9 P.3d 253, 256–57 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000)).
127
See Leary, supra note 94, at 9. “Children’s exposure to [child] pornography
can undermine their capabilities to avoid, resist, or escape sexual victimization, thereby making them more vulnerable to sexual victimization.” Id. at 14 (quoting Diana
E.H. Russell & Natalie J. Purcell, Exposure to Pornography as a Cause of Sexual Victimization, in HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN, CULTURE, AND VIOLENCE 59, 66 (Nancy E. Down, Dorothy G. Singer & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2006)).
128
See infra Part IV.
125
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129

dressed or continue to address sexting.
At minimum, these lawmakers are laudably attempting to distinguish child pornography laws
from sexting laws. Still, legislative action has thus far been primarily
130
limited to consensual sexting situations. Not surprisingly, state responses typically occur after a local sexting prosecution prompts public outcry.
A. Proposals: New Jersey, New York, and Ohio
When it comes to sexting, lawmakers in several states are only in
the preliminary stages of modernizing their states’ criminal codes.
Thus, even in the handful of states that have recognized sexting,
there is not always legislative finality.
New Jersey legislators were drawn to sexting after an incident in131
volving a Passaic County juvenile. The fourteen-year-old girl was arrested and faced child pornography charges after she posted nearly
132
thirty nude pictures of herself on MySpace. In response to this story and out-of-state sexting prosecutions, a New Jersey lawmaker took a
progressive approach to sexting. In June 2009, Assemblywoman Pamela Lampitt, a Democrat from Camden, New Jersey, sponsored
three bills in which she sought to provide for “education and forgive133
ness before arrest and prosecution.”
The bills, however, have sat
134
idle since their introduction and still await a full assembly vote.
Lampitt’s primary bill creates a diversionary program for juvenile sexting offenders who could avoid criminal charges if they
agreed to attend an educational program, which would highlight

129

See The Vexting Issue of ‘Sexting,’ NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/magazine/articles/2009/SL0709_Tren
ds.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2011) (stating that there are “hundreds of news stories”
focused on sexting and that legislatures “in at least nine states have introduced legislation this year aimed at deterring teens from sexting and preventing legal loopholes
that would allow sexual predators to escape prosecution”).
130
As noted, consensual sexting situations are those in which two or perhaps
more juveniles transmit photos of themselves and each juvenile participates knowingly and willfully. See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text. The concept extends
to instances in which one of the teens posts the photos of himself or herself on the
internet. Id.
131
Girl in Nude Photos Case Will Undergo Counseling, HERALD NEWS (New Jersey),
June 24, 2009, at B1.
132
Id. The article notes that the prosecutor agreed to drop the charges when the
girl stated she would undergo counseling during her six months of probation. Id.
133
Elise Young, N.J. Assemblywoman Pamela Lampitt Pushes Bills to Deal with Teen
‘Sexting,’ NJ.COM (July 20, 2009, 5:45 PM), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2009/
07/trenton_nj_ap_like.html.
134
See id.

LATZER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

6/16/2011 2:55 PM

1057

COMMENT
135

both the legal and non-legal consequences of sexting. Notably, the
bill limits the program to juveniles who created, exhibited, and dis136
tributed sexually explicit photos “without malicious intent.” Apparently, the bill would protect from criminal prosecution juveniles who
send or create either provocative photos of themselves or others or
137
photos of a sexually explicit nature. Moreover, by limiting the bill’s
138
reach to teens who acted “without malicious intent,” the bill is unlikely to protect teens from nonconsensual sexting prosecutions.
Lampitt’s proposed bill additionally provides for significant prosecu139
torial discretion.
It states that the “county prosecutor shall deter140
mine whether a juvenile shall be admitted to the program.”
In New York, the assembly has proposed a bill that, although less
specifically tailored than New Jersey’s, attempts to achieve similar underlying goals with a focus on education and criminal-punishment
141
leniency for some teen sexters.
First, the bill would require the
state to create an educational outreach program that would highlight
142
the dangers of sexting. Second, the bill would amend the penal law
to “provide an affirmative defense to young persons for certain acts
with regard to possession and dissemination of such images and pho143
tographs of themselves.” The defense would only apply where the
defendant was at least four years younger than the “individual who
received, sent or posted an image or photograph at issue in a criminal charge and where that individual expressly or implicitly ac144
quiesced in the defendant’s conduct.” As such, the bill would pre135

See Assemb. B. 4069, 213th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Sess. (N.J. 2009).
Id.
137
Id. This point is notable because the prosecutor in Miller sought to charge even
the teenagers who were pictured “provocatively.” Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp.
2d 364 (M.D. Pa. 2009). See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
138
See Assemb. B. 4069.
139
Id.; see also supra notes 54–59 and accompanying text; infra Part IV.B.
140
Assemb. B. 4069 § (1)(b).
141
See Assemb. B. 8622, 232nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009).
142
Id. The lawmakers cited the potential long-term harm to juvenile privacy that
may result from sexting.
Specifically, the bill would direct: [T]he office of children and family
services to establish an educational outreach program to promote the
awareness of text messaging, emailing and internet posting among adolescents, and create a campaign to address the potential long-term
harm that may arise as a result of adolescents sending, receiving or
posting on the internet images and photographs of themselves that include, but are not limited to, provocative or nude images.
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id. (emphasis added).
136
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sumably only provide a defense in consensual sexting situations, including those where the photos in question included nudity and
would thus ordinarily be criminalized under child pornography sta145
tutes. Importantly, though, the affirmative defense would not apply
when individuals forward pictures of third-party teens even with their
146
consent. Significantly, as in New Jersey, the bill awaits a vote from
147
the full assembly.
In Ohio, lawmakers were drawn to sexting following a very wellpublicized and tragic sexting incident involving Jessica Logan, an
148
eighteen-year-old who ultimately committed suicide. As in New Jersey and New York, though, Ohio’s proposed law awaits further ac149
tion. As currently drafted, the Ohio bill would create a misdemeanor punishment for a minor who, “by use of a telecommunications
device . . . recklessly create[s], receive[s], exchange[s], send[s], or
possess[es] a photograph, video, or other ‘material’ that shows a mi150
nor in a state of ‘nudity.’” The proposed law explicitly provides no
151
defense for the minor if he/she was pictured in the content. Under
these guidelines, a consensual sexter clearly would face misdemeanor
charges even when the content in question involved only pictures of
152
himself or herself. Additionally, a sexter would apparently fall under the bill’s ambit in an instance where the sexter forwarded pic153
tures of a third party with that third party’s consent. Further, lawmakers appear to intend to punish nonconsensual sexters under this
154
bill as well. For example, if a minor intentionally or knowingly forwarded nude pictures of his ex-girlfriend to her friends without her
consent, he would be deemed to have “recklessly” sent such photo155
graphy and would thus fall under the proposed law.

145

See id.
See id.
147
Assemb. B. 8622 (stating that the bill was referred to the assembly’s Ways and
Means Committee on June 10, 2009).
148
See Russ, supra note 14.
149
H.B. 132, 128th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2009).
150
Id.
151
Id. (“It is no defense to a charge under this section that the minor creates,
receives, exchanges, sends, or possesses a photograph, video, or other material that
shows [himself or herself] in a state of nudity.”).
152
See id.
153
See id.
154
See id.
155
This situation arose in State v. Vezzoni, No. 22361-2-III, 2005 Wash. App. LEXIS
864, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2005). See supra note 83–85 and accompanying
text.
146
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From Proposals to Laws: Vermont, Nebraska,
and Illinois

Some states have gone beyond mere proposals and turned ideas
into laws. In Vermont, lawmakers considered a similar approach to
156
157
that proposed in New Jersey but ultimately took a different route.
Sparked by a mother’s testimony before the state’s judiciary panel in
which the mother feared that her daughter could face child pornography charges after having unwillingly received a seminude video
158
depiction of another minor, the legislature reduced, but did not
eliminate, the penalties under the applicable child pornography
159
laws. Specifically, the law provides that “[n]o minor shall . . . use a
computer or electronic communication device to transmit an inde160
cent visual depiction of himself or herself to another person.” And
under the law, a minor is prohibited from possessing any such visual
161
Any minor found guilty under this provision will now
depiction.
162
face misdemeanor juvenile charges.
As such, the law creates a re163
duced punishment in consensual sexting situations where a minor
164
sends an “indecent” photo of “himself or herself.” Accordingly, the
law clearly does not provide lesser penalties for nonconsensual sexters. Moreover, it presumably does not provide more lenient punishment in a consensual sexting situation in which a teen forwards a
picture of a third party even with that third party’s consent. Thus, it
appears such an offender could be prosecuted under child pornography laws. The meaning of “indecent” and whether it attaches to
merely provocative photos under the law is also unclear. As a thorough review of the statute indicates, apparently but unsurprisingly,
judicial clarification is needed.
156
See Vermont Considers Legalizing Teen ‘Sexting,’ FOX NEWS (Apr. 13, 2009),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,514875,00.html (detailing that lawmakers
were considering decriminalizing consensual sexting between those thirteen to eighteen years old but that “[p]assing along such images to others would remain a
crime”).
157
See Kara Rowland, ‘Sexting’ Is Thorny Legal Issue, WASH. TIMES, June 23, 2009, at
B1, available at 2009 WLNR 11991138.
158
See id.
159
See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 2802b (2010).
160
§ 2802b(a)(1).
161
Id. The law absolves a teen from prosecution if he/she “took reasonable steps,
whether successful or not, to destroy or eliminate the visual depiction.” Id.
162
Id.
163
Previously, sexting offenders falling under the provision of this law were
charged as felons and forced to register as sex offenders. See Rowland, supra note
157.
164
See § 2802b.
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In Nebraska, the legislature also recently updated the state’s
165
child pornography statute to address sexting. Concerned with criminalizing the immature behavior of children, the state enacted two
166
affirmative defenses to felony child pornography charges. The first
affirmative defense is applicable to a teen under eighteen years of age
who “create[s] . . . or in any manner generate[s]” a sexually explicit
167
picture of himself or herself.
The second affirmative defense provides, in part, that a teenager eighteen-years-old or younger who
sends a sexually explicit image of himself or herself to a willing reci168
pient who is at least fifteen-years-old can avoid felony charges.
Importantly, under these guidelines, even assuming that the affirmative defenses do not apply, a prosecutor could not seek to pu169
nish children who sext mere provocative photos.
This is notable
because the prosecutor in Miller, utilizing his vast discretionary powers, sought to charge the teenagers for posing in a provocative na170
ture. Still, the Nebraska affirmative defenses are apparently somewhat limited, as neither defense protects teens who possess
171
nonconsensually sexted photos. Thus, although lawmakers should
be lauded for addressing sexting, Nebraska’s law is incomplete at
best, and as such, it tasks law enforcement officials with the discretion
to apply antiquated laws in many future sexting circumstances.
In Utah, legislators focused on the distribution element of sexting. Under Utah law, juveniles who are prosecuted under the state’s
172
child pornography-distribution statute or the “[d]ealing in material

165

NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1463.03 (2010).
See Ben Schwartz, Technology Moves Faster than the Law, N. PLATTE BULL. (July 26,
2009), http://www.northplattebulletin.com/index.asp?show=news&action=readStory
&storyID=16958&pageID=3&sectionID=3. The article quotes the state’s attorney
general, Jon Bruning, “We don’t want to treat childish behavior as criminal activity.”
Id.
167
§ 28-1463.03(1),(6).
168
Id. § 28-1463.03(6). In addition, the defense is only applicable where “the visual depiction . . . includes no person other than the defendant” and where “the defendant had a reasonable belief at the time the visual depiction was sent to another
that it was being sent to a willing recipient.” § 28-1463.03(6)(b),(c).
169
See id. § 28-1463.03. Sexting becomes criminal only when the visual depiction is
one of “sexually explicit conduct . . . which has a child as one of its participants or
portrayed observers.” Id. Sexually explicit conduct is defined in part as “real or simulated intercourse” and “erotic nudity.” Id. § 28-1463.02(5).
170
See Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 638 (M.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d sub
nom. Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010).
171
§ 28-1463.03.
172
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1204 (Lexis Nexis 2010).
166
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173

harmful to a minor” statute can now only be charged with a misde174
meanor as opposed to a felony. Specifically, the statute states that
juveniles who are sixteen or seventeen years old can be charged with
175
a class A misdemeanor, which is punishable by up to one year in jail
176
and a fine of no more than $2,500. Juveniles younger than age six177
teen can only be charged with a class B misdemeanor, which is punishable by up to six months in jail and a fine of no more than
178
$1,000. In passing the bill, Utah legislators recognized the inherent
sexting problem around the country and the controversy surround179
ing harsh juvenile punishments. Moreover, whether intentional or
otherwise, the Utah bill seems to provide leniency in both consensual
180
and nonconsensual sexting situations but only as far as the sender is

173

Id. § 76-10-1206.
H.B. 14, 58th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2009).
175
Id.
176
UTAH SENTENCING COMM’N, PENALTY DISTRIBUTION FOR SELECTED CRIMES 1
(2008), available at http://www.sentencing.utah.gov/Penalty%20Distribution/
PenaltyDistributionBooklet.pdf [hereinafter UTAH SENTENCING COMM’N].
177
H.B. 14, 58th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2009).
178
UTAH SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 176.
179
“[Juveniles] are less likely to recognize inherent risks and consider long-term
consequences of their choices.” H.B. 14, 58th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Jan. 27, 2009) (statement of Rep. Sheryl Allen), available at http://le.utah.gov/asp/audio/index.asp?
Sess=2009GS&Day=2&House=H. “If we can get these young people into court, they
can be counseled and assisted.” Id.
180
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1206 (Lexis Nexis 2010). In regard to dealing in material harmful to a minor:
(1) A person is guilty of dealing in material harmful to minors when,
knowing or believing that a person is a minor, or having negligently
failed to determine the proper age of a minor, the person intentionally:
(a) distributes or offers to distribute, exhibits or offers to exhibit, to a minor or a person the actor believes to be a minor, any
material harmful to minors;
(b) produces, performs, or directs any performance, before a
minor or a person the actor believes to be a minor, that is harmful to minors; or
(c) participates in any performance, before a minor or a person
the actor believes to be a minor, that is harmful to minors.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1204 (Lexis Nexis 2010) provides that in regard to distributing pornographic material:
(1) A person is guilty of distributing pornographic material when the
person knowingly:
. . . (c) distributes or offers to distribute, or exhibits or offers to exhibit, any pornographic material to others.
174
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181

concerned.
Thus, a teen in receipt of sexted content could presumably still face felony charges even if the pictures were consensually sent. In contrast, a teen who nonconsensually sexted pictures
would only face misdemeanor charges under the updated provision.
Illinois lawmakers have also focused on the distribution aspect of
sexting. Under its recently updated law, Illinois provides that a minor who “distribute[s] or disseminate[s] an indecent visual depiction
of another minor” using a cell phone or a computer “may be[] or182
dered to obtain counseling” or “perform community service.”
As
with Utah’s sexting legislation, the Illinois law affords lesser punishment in both consensual and nonconsensual sexting situations but
183
only for the sender. Therefore, as in Utah, a teen in possession of
sexted material could conceivably still face felony charges even if the
184
pictures were consensually sexted. Nevertheless, a teen who sexted
pictures, even nonconsensually, would apparently face considerably
lesser charges under the state’s updated law.
In contrast to the abovementioned legislatures, most state law185
makers remain silent about sexting.
Silence even emanates from
states that have prosecuted sexting offenders, including the Iowa and
Florida where teens were prosecuted in A.H. and Canal, respective186
ly. Even in states that have addressed the issue, many bills remain
187
pending, and, as the above examples illustrate, current laws often
do not account for the many aspects of sexting, including both the
possession and distribution elements. The importance of finding an
appropriate and all-encompassing solution to sexting cannot be understated, as “[t]he sexual development of both youth (victims and

181
Notably, the lawmakers did not lessen the penalties under UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-5a-3, which provides in part, “[A] person is guilty of sexual exploitation of a minor
. . . when the person knowingly . . . possesses . . . child pornography.” Id. § 76-5a-3.
182
705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/3-40(b)–(d)(2) (2010).
183
See id.
184
Illinois’ child pornography statute punishes anyone who, “with the knowledge
of the nature or content thereof, . . . possesses with intent to disseminate” an image
of a child “depicted or portrayed in any pose, posture or setting involving a lewd exhibition of the unclothed or transparently clothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or,
if such person is female, a fully or partially developed breast of the child or other
person.” 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-20.1(2), (1)(vii) (2010).
185
Notably, however, as of this Comment’s publication date, additional states were
continuing to address sexting. See 2010 Legislation Related to ‘Sexting,’ NAT’L CONF. OF
STATE LEGS., http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=19696 (last updated Jan. 4,
2011).
186
See State v. Canal, 773 N.W.2d 528, 529 (Iowa 2009); A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d
234, 241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
187
See supra notes 180–83.
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offenders) is underway and if these incidents are not handled appro188
priately both . . . may be harmed[] developmentally.”
Moreover,
this Comment strongly urges that without a proper legislative response, prosecutorial discretion will govern, perpetuating unpredict189
able and at times undesirable results.
IV. THE PROPER LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION TO SEXTING
190

The term “sexting” is importantly an all-encompassing word.
Without a thorough consideration of the numerous circumstances in
which sexting cases arise, however, society cannot properly respond.
As the examples above illustrate, lawmakers have struggled to develop
191
one all-encompassing response to sexting.
Still, with sexting manifestations widespread, legislators must draw lines and prepare appropriate anticipatory laws under the following guidelines.
A. Clarify the Legislative Intent
Lawmakers must clarify the legislative intent behind child pornography statutes by updating laws or creating new ones that are applicable in both consensual and nonconsensual sexting circumstances. Legislators probably did not anticipate that prosecutors
would utilize child pornography laws against the very same people
192
whom the laws were designed to protect.
In passing child pornography laws, lawmakers clearly aimed to eradicate any and all child
pornography. But laws must keep pace with technology. Consensual
sexting offenders should not face punishment under child pornography statutes merely because the exchanged pictures may circulate

188
See Leary, supra note 94, at 26 (citing Roberta Lynn Sinclair & David Sugar,
The Nat’l Child Exploitation Coordination Ctr. (NCECC) Strategic Operations Support Servs., Internet Based Sexual Exploitation of Children and Youth: Environmental Scan
7, 25 (2005)) (internal quotations omitted).
189
See, e.g., Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634 (M.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d sub
nom. Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010); see also infra Part IV.
190
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
191
See supra Part III.
192
Kim Zetter, Child Porn Laws Used Against Kids Who Photograph Themselves,
WIRED.com (Jan. 15, 2009, 9:50 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/
2009/01/kids/. Mark Rasch, a former federal cybercrime prosecutor, said, “The
problem is that the child porn laws were really designed for a situation where an
adult abuses a minor by forcing that minor . . . psychologically as well as physically . .
. into taking these pictures.” Id. When these laws are applied to sexting, Rasch argues, this “turns the whole statute on its head.” Id.; see Smith, supra note 63 and accompanying text; see also Berger, supra note 113 (asserting that child pornography
laws were passed to bring to justice “the grown-up perverts”).
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193

publicly. Moreover, prosecutorial application of child pornography
laws to nonconsensual sexters is also inappropriate because the harsh
punishments are disproportional to the sexting conduct.
As an impetus to update laws to ensure that they are consistent
with the legislative intent behind child pornography laws, at least in
the context of consensual sexting, legislators should consider a recent
Utah Supreme Court case. In State ex. rel. Z.C., prosecutors charged a
child under the state’s sexual abuse statute after the child engaged in
194
consensual sex with another minor.
Ruling for the defendantminor, the court held that to treat the defendant “as both a victim
and a perpetrator of child sex abuse for the same act leads to an ab195
surd result that was not intended by the legislature.” The court further stated that, at least in the context of sexual-assault crimes, no
196
other prosecution could produce such an undesirable result.
Applied to the consensual-sexting context, this ruling is instruc197
tive. In many sexting prosecutions, the “State treats both children
198
as perpetrators of the same act.” As such, the state is not protecting
199
any “discernable victim.” And as with the sexual assault case in Z.C.,
a consensual-sexting prosecution produces an undesirable result contrary to the legislative intent behind the child pornography laws.
As a separate parallel to sexting and the need for legislators to
update or clarify the legislative intent behind child pornography laws,
legislators should also consider the prosecutorial decision to punish
193
Such prosecution may even constitute criminalization of conduct that is protected by a constitutional right to privacy. See A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 241 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (Padovano, J., dissenting). In criticizing the majority ruling, in
which the court upheld two consensual-sexting convictions under the state’s child
pornography laws, the dissent argued that “[t]he statute at issue was designed to protect children, but in this case the court has allowed the state to use it against a child
in a way that criminalizes conduct that is protected by constitutional right of privacy.”
Id.
194
State ex rel. Z.C.,165 P.3d 1206, 1206 (Utah 2007). In part, the statute holds
that “[a] person commits sexual abuse of a child” if the person “touches the anus,
buttocks, or genitalia of any child, the breast of a female child, or otherwise takes indecent liberties with a child.” UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-404.1 (LexisNexis 2010).
195
Z.C., 165 P.3d at 1206.
196
Id. at 1212 (“We know of no other instance in which the State has attempted to
apply any sexual assault crime to produce such an effect.”).
197
See Jesse Michael Nix, Note, Unwholesome Activities in a Wholesome Place: Utah
Teens Creating Pornography and the Establishment of Prosecutorial Guidelines, 11 J.L. & FAM.
STUD. 183, 187 (2008) (arguing that “[s]ince the [Z.C.] court ruled that sexual assault crimes presuppose a perpetrator and a victim, the court likely would view teenagers trading nude photos of themselves to each other in the same way”).
198
Z.C., 165 P.3d at 1212.
199
Id.
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statutory rape.
The 1996 California case In re Meagan R. proves
instructive in this context. There, the court held that the defendant,
a fourteen-year-old girl who had sex with a twenty-two-year-old man,
202
could not be punished under the state’s statutory rape law, which
provides that “[u]nlawful sexual intercourse is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person who is not the spouse of the per203
petrator, if the person is a minor.” Because the defendant was the
victim, the court held that the legislative intent behind the law was
such that she could not be charged with conspiracy, aiding and abet204
ting, or as an accomplice to her own statutory rape. Applying this
reasoning to sexting, a consensual sexter should not fall victim to
205
child pornography statutes.
These prosecutorial parallels and judicial analyses provide concrete reasons why child pornography statutes are inapplicable in consensual-sexting prosecutions. Further legislative clarification of child
pornography laws is also necessary for nonconsensual-sexting prosecutions. By clarifying that the laws that were designed to eliminate
child pornography to protect children and not punish them, legislators
should concede that they in no way anticipated the application of
such laws to nonconsensual sexting situations involving teenagers.
Even assuming that legislators are intent on eliminating any and all
child pornography—surely a desirable and necessary goal—and not
206
just the conventional variety, they cannot accomplish this task at the
risk of severely criminalizing teenage indiscretion.
B. Limit Prosecutorial Discretion
Without proper legislative action, prosecutors will continue to
wield considerable discretion in determining how to combat sexting.
When discretion in sexting cases rests solely with a prosecutor, he or
she typically acts in a manner designed to send a message to the sext200

See Clerk: Child Self-Pornography, DE NOVO (Apr. 12, 2004, 10:59 AM),
http://www.blogdenovo.org/archives/169.html.
201
In re Meagan R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 325 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
202
Id.
203
CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (Deering 2010).
204
Meagan R., 49 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
205
See Eugene Volokh, Child Prosecuted for Child Pornography—of Herself, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY
(Mar,
31,
2004,
9:38
AM),
http://volokh.com/
2004_03_28_volokh_archive.html (“[I]t hardly seems to be much of a service to [the
alleged sexting offender]—who is after all the supposed victim as well as the perpetrator—or to the fight against child porn more broadly.”).
206
See Smith, supra note 63 (arguing that the child pornography laws were designed to combat “conventional” child pornography).
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208

ing offenders. Sometimes the message is harsh. Other times, the
209
prosecutorial message is more reasonable. No matter the severity of
the ultimate message sent, many prosecutors are clearly intent on li210
miting sexting.
Even legislatures have recognized that prosecutorial discretion
sometimes leads to questionable results in sexting cases. In Nebraska,
211
during legislative debates regarding the state’s sexting bill, an assistant attorney general promised that he would never misuse his discre212
tion. He moreover expressed confidence that his prosecutorial colleagues would utilize the same caution before charging juveniles
213
under child pornography statutes. Still, a Nebraska senator, recognizing the high number of sexting prosecutions across the country,
cautioned that legislative action is clearly necessary to limit prosecu214
torial discretion.
Indeed, as the Nebraska senator recognized, not all prosecutors
appropriately exercise their discretion in sexting cases. The actions
of the district attorney in Miller, who asserted that he could utilize the
state’s child pornography laws to punish children pictured in mere
provocative photos, properly illustrate this assertion, and thus, the

207
See, e.g., Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 637 (M.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d
sub nom. Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010).
208
See, e.g., A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); State v. Canal,
773 N.W.2d 528, 529 (Iowa 2009).
209
In Newark, Ohio, for instance, a fifteen-year-old girl was arrested and charged
under the state’s child pornography statutes after she sent racy photos of herself to
classmates. Martha Irvine, Porn Charges for ‘Sexting’ Stir Debate, MSNBC (Feb. 4, 2009,
4:00 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29017808/.
Prosecutors ultimately
agreed to drop the charges, provided that the girl abides by a curfew, has no cell
phone use, and has no unsupervised internet access over the next few months. Id.
210
“Hopefully we’ll get the message out to these kids,” said Michael McAlexander,
a prosecutor in Allen County, Indiana, where a teenage boy is facing obscenity
charges for allegedly sending pictures of his genitals to classmates. James Merriweather & Ira Porter, TeXt-Rated Teens, NEWS. J. (Wilmington, Del.), Feb. 6, 2009, at
A1, available at 2009 WLNR 18256595. “We don’t want to throw these kids in jail.
But we want them to think.” Id.
211
See supra Part III.
212
Hearing on L.B. 97 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Leg., 1st Sess. 6
(Neb. 2009) (statement of Corey O’Brien, Assistant Attorney General) (“I personally
would never charge someone where they were going to face [felony] penalties for
[sexting], because that, again, is not a pedophile”).
213
Id. O’Brien added, “I guess I have a lot of confidence in my brethren in the
prosecution field that they would feel the same way I do . . . .” Id.
214
Id. Senator Brenda Council said, “[P]erhaps it’s something that needs to be
addressed [by this legislature], and I appreciate the confidence you express in the
county attorneys in the state of Nebraska, but . . . clearly, that’s not the wave across
the nation.” Id.
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case evidences the need for legislators to corral prosecutorial discre215
tion in sexting cases.
The Miller case stands as one of several examples of prosecutorial
216
indiscretion. Indeed, a new sexting story seemingly develops each
217
day. Without guidance from legislators, prosecutorial responses will
remain at best inconsistent and at worst unforgiving and unreasonable.
C. Address the Two Broad Categories of Sexting: Consensual and
Nonconsensual
1.

Consensual Sexting

Lawmakers must entirely decriminalize consensual sexting of
mere provocative pictures. When photos do not rise to the level of
child pornography, but sexting offenders are nonetheless prosecuted
under child pornography statutes, questions arise about whether such
prosecution infringes on the offender’s rights to free speech and privacy. While a specific discussion of such implications is beyond the
scope of this Comment, the Miller case makes clear that courts may
not sit idly when the government potentially infringes the constitu218
tionally protected rights to free speech and privacy.
Regardless of
the potential free speech and privacy implications, consensual sexting
of merely provocative pictures is an issue reserved for parents and
schools to discuss with children—including the associated consequences. With respect to consensual sexting of merely provocative
photos, though, such consequences should not include criminal sanctions.
States should also lighten penalties for consensual sexting of
sexually explicit material. Lawmakers must create a statutory framework in which consensual sexting offenders are punished in the juvenile justice system and offered counseling for their indiscretions.
Perhaps most importantly, parental intervention is vital. Parents must
communicate with their children “about issues of sexuality, privacy
and appropriate boundaries long before they come across seminude

215
See Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634 (M.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d sub nom.
Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010); see supra Part II.
216
See, e.g., A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
217
See, e.g., Michelle Esteban et al., 3 Teens Arrested in Sexting Case, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER (Jan. 28, 2010, 10:14 PM), http://www.seattlepi.com/local/
414792_sexting28.html.
218
See Miller, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 643–47.
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pictures on their kids’ social networking pages.”
Under this approach, teenage indiscretion will not create any significant criminal
implications. And proper guidance will hopefully deter teens from
engaging in future sexting entirely.
2.

Nonconsensual Sexting

Legislatures thus far either do not truly grasp, or alternatively
choose to ignore, the broad category of nonconsensual sexting. The
time is ripe, however, for legislators to confront it. States should utilize misdemeanor charges to punish those who forward sexted pictures with the intent to cause emotional harm or distress to the pictured juvenile. Punishment should be reserved for the senders, not
the juvenile recipient of the photos unless such recipient coerced the
sender into forwarding the photos or later forwarded the photos
himself to a third party.
D. Eliminate Sex-Offender Registries
Lawmakers must eliminate sex-offender registration require220
ments for teens in all sexting circumstances. Legislators can easily
accomplish this task by punishing nonconsensual sexting offenders
221
with misdemeanor charges. As the Alpert story best illustrates, juvenile sex-offender registration can trigger harsh consequences. As a
registered sex offender, Alpert was forced to leave his community col222
lege before graduating and is now unable to find a job. In addition,
he cannot live with his own father, whose house is situated too close
223
to a high school—an area where sex offenders are prohibited.

219
O’Crowley, supra note 18 (quoting John Shehan, director of the Exploited
Child Division of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children) (emphasis added).
220
Because some young adults, such as Phillip Alpert, have fallen victim to sexoffender registration for sexting offenses, this Comment further notes that legislatures should consider protecting young adults from such sex-offender registration
provided that they have had a relationship with the sexting subject and are of a similar age. See Email from Lawrence G. Walters, Attorney at Law, Walters Law Group, to
author (Jan. 8, 2010) (on file with author) (suggesting such a solution for young
adults).
221
See supra notes 117–20 and accompanying text. Alpert was eighteen when he
was convicted under the state’s child pornography statute and forced to register as a
sex offender. Id. As such, he was considered an adult under the applicable criminal
statutes. Id. Still, Alpert’s story is illustrative because the same consequences stemming from sex-offender registration would apply to a juvenile, as well. Id.
222
See Richards & Calvert, supra note 118, at 9.
223
Id. at 21.
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More generally, researchers have found juvenile sex-offender
registration problematic in that it does not consider juvenile cogni224
These three factive ability, mental illness, or child development.
225
tors nonetheless play a crucial role in juvenile offending.
Most juvenile sex offenders do not understand their behavior,
and they must overcome that denial and work through that fear
to create behavioral changes. One of the largest fears is that the
reaction of the community and sex offender registration validates
that fear, allowing the juvenile to believe there is no possibility of
226
change.

Without prompt, one state supreme court recently made refer227
ence to sex-offender registration for juvenile sexting offenders.
It
too recognized, although impliedly, that such sex-offender registra228
tion should be eliminated. In oral arguments before the Utah Supreme Court in a case regarding the state’s sex-offender registry, the
Chief Justice implied that such a penalty was too harsh for sexting of229
fenders.
In response to the Chief Justice’s question, the attorney
representing the state replied that “[t]aking dirty [photos] with a cell
230
phone hardly seems like an offense deserving such a punishment.”
Legislators should follow the Chief Justice’s lead and recognize
that any sexting punishment must be proportional to the act. When
sex-offender registration consequences stem from sexting, the punishment far outweighs the act. This is true even in nonconsensual
sexting circumstances, such as Philip Alpert’s, where youthful indiscretion should not trigger a punishment that forever alters the offender’s life.
V. CONCLUSION
As technology evolves, lawmakers have a duty to make certain
that criminal laws keep pace. Without proper legislative attention,
224

See Leary, supra note 95, at 46 (citing Robert E. Longo & Martin C. Calder, The
Use of Sex Offender Registration with Young People Who Sexually Abuse, in CHILDREN AND
YOUNG PEOPLE WHO SEXUALLY ABUSE 334 (Martin C. Calder ed., 2005)).
225
Id.
226
Id.
227
See Nix, supra note 197, at 187 (citing Audio recording: Utah Supreme Court
Oral Arguments before Utah Supreme Court in State v. Briggs, No. 20070186 (Utah
Oct. 31, 2008), http://www.utcourts.gov/courts/sup/streams/index.cgi?mon=20084
(click “Listen” next to “State v. Briggs 20060671”)).
228
See id.
229
Id.
230
Id. (citing Geoffrey Fattah, Parents Fear Kids Will Be on Sex List, DESERET
MORNING NEWS, Apr. 5, 2008, at B1, available at 2008 WLNR 6417638).
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prosecutors are compelled to apply antiquated statutes to unintended
circumstances, commonly resulting in undesirable consequences.
The context of teenage sexting perfectly illustrates this principle; in
recent years, prosecutors have employed child pornography statutes
with harsh attendant circumstances to target immature teens making
questionable decisions.
Now, more than ever, with statistics indicating that sexting is
prevalent among teens, legislatures must take action. Even recognizing that one cannot predict all potential sexting circumstances, and
as such, it would be largely impossible for lawmakers to create one allencompassing law, legislative inaction is inexcusable. To start, lawmakers should reference legislative solutions from other states, including Utah and Illinois, and even mere proposals, such as those
discussed in New Jersey.
Although largely flawed, the statutes provide lawmakers with necessary background guidance to address an issue of utmost public
importance. Notably, proper legislative action would help curtail fu231
ture unsympathetic judicial rulings.
Moreover, and perhaps most
importantly, lawmakers must act to prevent further prosecutorial in232
By estabdiscretions, which were apparent in Miller v. Skumanick.
lishing guidelines that directly address both consensual and nonconsensual sexting, lawmakers can assure that teenage indiscretion does
not in turn result in prosecutorial indiscretion. With an understanding
that harsh criminal consequences, including sex-offender registration, are inappropriate for teens even in the context of nonconsensual sexting, lawmakers can properly uphold public policy goals relating to both the elimination of child pornography and proportional
punishments for teens. If legislatures fail to act properly, or worse, sit
idly, prosecutors will continue to act blindly and inconsistently, and
America’s teens will suffer the consequences.

231

See, e.g., A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
See Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 637 (M.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d sub
nom. Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010).
232

